Crisis of classical ideologies of the 19th century. ideology -. The crisis of classical ideologies at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. and search for new models of social development

Ideology

Crisis and the end of the era of ideologies

The peculiarity of today's crisis is global confusion. People feel insecure all over the world. Nobody understands what is the right thing to do. At the same time, nothing really terrible and irreparable happened, at least not yet. But in the air there seems to be a feeling of slowly but inevitably impending formidable events. As one ironic blogger on LiveJournal noted, “Before spitting it out, God chews us slowly, like chewing gum.”

Something similar happened just before the collapse Soviet Union. Already a year and a half before the August coup (or the unsuccessful August attempt at counter-revolution) and the Belavezha agreements, it became clear that the country would soon become completely different. The collapse of the USSR, the painful demolition of the former way of life and shock reforms were also approaching slowly, without haste, as they say, "with a delay."

However, what does the current slow, protracted pace of the crisis really mean? Maybe, in fact, everything is not so bad, and they only frighten us in vain, as they say, specially “nightmares”? This is the task of the media - they constantly need a sensation. What could be more understandable for the press than to produce apocalyptic forecasts stretched out over many months? But they will constantly keep the audience in suspense and every time they will be perceived as a sensation. The semi-hysterical attention of the public is guaranteed. And there, you see, everything will be forgotten: a terrible dream, but God is merciful.

Today's Russia is not an ideological country

Indeed, it is not given to us to predict how current events will turn out. You can't know your future history. Maybe everything will work out. However, in today's situation, the readiness with which bad news began to be met with is surprising. Confusion is everywhere, but perhaps nowhere is there such a mood that all this is not accidental. It is as if here, in Russia, people deep down, long before the officially declared crisis, were ready for a global, total disruption.

This is due to the fact that with the fall of the Soviet Union, we no longer had an ideological project that would be common to all. For some, the social ideal was liberal democracy, for some Soviet socialism, for some the Byzantine Empire, but there was no decisive general agreement on this issue. This was the reason for Putin's defensive policy, mainly of a tactical nature, aimed at holding and stabilizing. Today's Russia is not an ideological country. The feeling of deep uncertainty was in no small measure due to the absence of a clear plan “how we should equip Russia”, with which the decisive majority of society would agree. Hence the uncertainty - from the uncertainty with the answer to the question, in what country and in what world do we live?

Today's crisis is a crisis of ideology as such

Now, suddenly, a deep sense of insecurity and uncertainty was not unique to us. After all, if we compare the deadly Soviet crisis twenty years ago and the current crisis, already worldwide, that's what you can see. Then, having lost faith in the communist ideology, they wanted capitalism. Confidence in the "beautiful far away" was based on the fact that there was a ready-made "assembly model" at hand - a liberal democratic ideology. There was also a clear example that everything would be fine - the West. There, with their brains and hands, people created a “normal” life for themselves, finally settled securely and comfortably on Earth, unlike us, unfortunate. Therefore, that crisis took place in some kind of ecstasy, intoxicating fever. In Germany, they happily demolished the Berlin Wall, erasing the border between East and West, and we were happy about that too. The musical backdrop for the radical change was Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" to Schiller's words: "Hug, millions"!

Today, greetings to the impending thunderstorm are not heard at all. This time, there is neither a ready-made ideological model for assembly at hand, nor a specific example of where they know and know how to do it right. The system of the Western way and the device of life as a whole failed. Not only the model of financial capitalism has been called into question, but also the associated liberal-democratic ideology. It turns out that it also does not guarantee a reliable existence on Earth.

However, the peculiarity of the “current moment” is that democratic liberalism is not being replaced by any other ideology that could act as an alternative to it on a global scale. After all, an ideology is only an ideology when its claims are of a universal nature, when it claims to the whole world, to the fact that only on its basis it is possible to securely settle down on Earth. Thus, the question arises: does not the current crisis, the associated crisis of the liberal model and the absence of an alternative model, mean the beginning of the end of the new European era of ideologies in general?

What is ideology

The term "ideology" was introduced by the French philosopher and economist A.L.K. Destut de Tracy's early XIX centuries to designate the doctrine of ideas, which will establish a solid foundation for politics and ethics. Ideology as such is a new European phenomenon associated with an attempt to emancipate a person from religion in modern and contemporary times. Its essence is that ideology claims to understand the logic of history, to penetrate into this logic and to possess knowledge of how human society should be organized. Ideology is built by rational means, appeals to rational knowledge and proposes projects of one or another type of social structure, which humanity must implement in real life on its own. Therefore, ideology is an attempt by a person to securely settle down on Earth only relying on his own strength and reason. In this sense, the concept of “Christian ideology” is no less an oxymoron than wooden iron. Naturally, I do not want to say that there cannot be societies where Christianity or another religion will be the dominant form of social consciousness. But Christianity is non-ideological and non-political. It focuses not on earthly self-disposition, but rather on the rejection of it in the hope of God's help.

At the same time, the current calls to urgently create a new “fourth theory” do not really lead to anything. They only emphasize the current lack of "theory" as such and the confusion of a person before the question of what to do now.

To this we can add that it is no coincidence that the degeneration of politics is now observed. The current leading politicians do not look serious. So Venezuelan Hugo Chavez or Bolivian President Evo Morales are rather a parody of the Cuban revolutionaries of forty years ago, and, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy is a parody of de Gaulle. Disappointment in politics and disillusionment in ideologies are interrelated phenomena: it turns out that they cannot deliver what they promise. And accordingly, on the political scene, which in many respects is already considered a sphere of rivalry and struggle of ideologies only by inertia, semi-parodic figures turn out to be the leading figures. One has only to look at the previous US president or the current president. These are, let's say, not the Roosevelts, not geniuses. For example, when looking at B. Obama, there is a strong suspicion that he really can’t do anything and decides nothing, but is a purely image project.

Three main ideologies

Liberalism, communism, and fascism are the three major dominant political theories that, as the French conservative Alain de Benoist writes, spawned many intermediate ideological currents in the 20th century (1).

He notes that “theories that appeared later disappeared earlier than others. Fascism, having appeared later than all, died faster than all the others. Then communism. Liberalism, the oldest of these three theories, is the last to disappear” (2).
Of these three main ideologies, liberalism is the least expansionist. Unlike communism, it leaves a certain space of freedom for religion. In liberalism, as an ideological frame of mind, there is generally some confidence in the givens of life. As Friedrich Hayek wrote, “Having traced the cumulative effect of individual actions, we find that many of the institutions on which human achievement is based have arisen and function without the participation of an inventive and directing mind; that, in the words of Adam Ferguson, "nations stumble over institutions that are really the result of human action, not human intention" (3).

At the same time, one of the defining features of liberalism lies in the rather anthropological realm - this is the understanding of man as a self-sufficient autonomous being, full of "nervous self-esteem", in the words of our Konstantin Leontiev. Communism is a bet on the collective "we", which for the philosophy of communism is the true foundation and focus of being. Liberalism, on the other hand, is a stake on the individual "I" as its own master. Who is more effective in mastering the world - the individual liberated "I" or the collective, united "we" - this is one of the central points of disagreement between communism and liberalism.

The deadly crisis of the ideology of communism and the communist system happened 20 years ago. The collective “we” lost the battle to the individual “I” claiming autonomy, because the structure of life based on the latter was both more flexible and at the same time more in line with inner human vanity and pride. If under communism I personally still have to humble myself before the party and the state, meet their strict, draconian norms, then under modern capitalism I can lead almost any way of life. However, it seems that Babylon did not last very long.

True, even if we are right in our forecast of the coming change of epochs, it is clear that it will not happen all at once. The past does not always go away immediately, it seems to disappear or crumble in parts. We should not expect that tomorrow a new world awaits us. The future will win its place gradually, and the past will resist and cling to life for a long time to come. So, for a long time and gradually left, antiquity surrendered the battlefield, and then, almost a thousand years later, the Middle Ages.

Crisis is Judgment

The word "crisis" comes from antiquity. In ancient Greek it means "judgment". If the crisis is understood as a judgment on presumptuous humanity, then it is absurd to count on, as they say, “settlement of the crisis”, on a successful “fight against the crisis”. The defendant is not able to fight the court, at least on an equal footing. The trial ends with a verdict. Only in this sense can a court case be “settled”. And escape is also excluded. In the sphere of being, as M. Bakhtin noted, there can be no alibi.

The final verdict of the current court-crisis has not yet been announced, as well as the punishment. But in today's example of almost panicky perception, even initial stage future highly probable upheavals, we can conclude that it will not work for a person to settle down firmly on Earth, this is impossible. The person himself knows this in the very depths of his soul, otherwise the current mass panic moods would not exist. The “end of history” proclaimed twenty years ago by F. Fukuyama and the irreversible victory of the liberal ideology are just as unrealizable as the bright communist future.

As for Russia as a non-ideological country, here one can, oddly enough, try to extract strength from weakness. What seemed like an obvious disadvantage just recently may, paradoxically, turn into an advantage. With the end of ideologies, our lack of a dominant ideology gives us a greater degree of freedom than Western countries. We are not tied to any project, which means we have a wider horizon of vision, and therefore more opportunities for action.

In addition, we may not have had time to get used to the material prosperity that Western civilization organized for a historically relatively short time, and which we have been trying to arrange for ourselves for a very short time. Never before has mankind, at least a significant part of it, lived as well off as in the second half of the 20th century. But did someone give a 100% guarantee that it would last forever? As for us, then, as Vasily Shukshin said with some anguish and at the same time with humility, “we never lived well, it’s not a damn thing to start.”

It does not matter to live in the material plane - this is only for the better in the sense that this state of affairs continues to prolong history. In Christian theology, the last times are unequivocally associated with the times of universal material well-being. A person of this era is much less capable of both creativity and self-sacrifice.

However, the departure from the principle of ideology as an attempt at active self-organization on Earth does not necessarily mean a rejection of activity in general. A merchant can be extremely active in his own way, an officer in his own way, a monk in his own way. The question is what active activity is aimed at: is it an attempt at self-satisfied self-organization and self-exaltation, or is it following values ​​higher than earthly guidelines.

2 Ibid. S. 28.

3 Hayek F. True and false individualism // About freedom. Anthology of world liberal thought (first half of the 20th century). M., 2000. S. 389-390.

Albert Naryshkin

Crisis of ideologies: where is Russia heading in the 21st century

The question of the need for ideology in Russia and its choice is raised with enviable constancy, after which kilometer-long disputes begin between adherents of different ideas. The most radical proposals and ways of developing the country are put forward, very cool measures and methods are proposed, but after a heated debate, everyone remains of their opinion, not one step closer to that cherished one, for which all disputes begin.

Ideologies, whatever one may say, need supporters, but they cannot be gathered into any large force: to convince or convince millions of people. Many contemporaries are simply indifferent to this issue, as well as all the ideas discussed.

Crisis of ideologies

As harsh as it sounds, ideology is a kind of phantom pain. Three generations got used to living with it, and now people simply think that this is an indispensable attribute of the state. Although ideology, strictly speaking, is only a child of the 20th century. It came into force only when religion, the monarchy and the class structure of society, which served as an unwritten "public constitution", finally lost their influence. Religion dictated rules and norms mainly for commoners, the nobility lived within its limits of what was permitted, required and mandatory, and the monarchy crowned the building of the state system. The common people knew how to treat the nobles and the monarch, the nobles knew how to treat each other and the monarch, there was a clear system of vassalage, and the church legitimized the whole system. When they collapsed, great ideologies took their place.

But the 20th century has passed, and with it all ideologies have degraded. For example, the brightest in the last century, the communist one, which claimed a total victory for the minds of mankind, was either rejected everywhere or mutated into odious forms.

In the same China, which by inertia is still considered communist, the original ideas were crossed with capitalism, so that only the name remained of communism.

Even earlier, the ideology of fascism collapsed. Instead, the West began to build a liberal ideology of human rights, which was very convenient, as it explained the need for confrontation with the Soviet Union. To do this, the West initiated the signing of various declarations guaranteeing rights and freedoms, the West even proclaimed itself a "world of freedom", pretending that it sacredly observes all the adopted declarations. The USSR was declared a totalitarian regime with widespread violation of all human rights, freedom of speech, political freedoms, and so on, which, strictly speaking, was only partly true, otherwise detant, “détente” would have been impossible. And the West greatly exaggerated its achievements in the field of observance of all kinds of rights and freedoms. But at the level of declarations, this was quite suitable - most Westerners were convinced by such rhetoric, and nothing else was required.

At the same time, it turned out that ideologies were suitable as a weapon of informational confrontation, and as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, the coherent unified idea of ​​the “free world” of the West began to actively degrade, and a free tolerant society suddenly appeared very heterogeneous and full of contradictions.

It would be premature to say that ideologies in general should be given up as a bad job. Perhaps this is just a temporary phenomenon associated with a historical period. Now there has been some reverse movement - deglobalization - and much that was built in the 20th century is canceled and becomes irrelevant. But perhaps in 50-100 years, when the current turbulence subsides, new ideologies will emerge, the concept itself will evolve into something else.

In any case, the development of society proceeds in stages, and today all ideologies are in crisis. It would be appropriate to simply accept this as a given and build a system for today that would not be based on dogmatic ideology. The future, perhaps, will return ideologies - already transformed and at a new level.

Everyone has his own path

United States, as well as Russia and China, are an independent civilization, and the position of the "leader of the free world" only strengthened this trend. The American idea has always been slightly different from the European one: the famous “great American dream” is a kind of localization of the northern European Protestant work ethic. Another difference was the American constitution with the notorious Bill of Rights. In addition, the Americans were the first to introduce the idea of ​​equality of opportunity for all. As has been said, American beggars cannot be swayed to revolution because 80% of them believe that they are only temporarily beggars and will become millionaires in the future.

It is obvious that most of the slogans in America, as well as in Europe, China and the USSR, were only slogans, and in life everything turned out to be “not so simple”. Today in the United States, after the adoption of the Patriot Act, it is simply ridiculous to talk about personal freedoms and guarantees. There, all this has long been replaced by the idea of ​​consumption.

Europe since the beginning of the 21st century, it has begun to actively develop the idea of ​​neoliberalism: super-freedoms for all minorities with the intention of giving their interests a higher priority than the interests of the majority of people who adhere to traditional values. Now we can already say that a uniform offensive has begun on the church and religions (all traditional), on the institution of the family, the institution of marriage, on the system of relations between parents and a child, a man and a woman. The Europeans have already thought of the idea that the child should “decide for himself what gender he is”, which is just one of the odious examples of their modern neo-liberal politics.

China also abandoned the dogmatic communist ideology and set about building his own model of state capitalism, not particularly paying attention to international acts that they tried to impose from the outside and make mandatory. China decided that an uncontrolled Internet would not be good for the country, and put the Internet under centralized control. Which, by the way, does not prevent the Chinese from having the world's largest online companies, including international ones.

We can say that China was the first to abandon devotion to the “purity of the idea” (which is what the current Brussels is so infected with) and began to act according to the principle “it suits us - we take it, it doesn’t suit us - we reject it.” And if someone believes that the first and second should only go together, then the Chinese, who have made a colossal breakthrough over the past 25 years, do not care deeply about their opinion. They did not simply copy each element taken from outside one-to-one, but transformed it so that it optimally fits into the existing system and best suits the goals at the moment.

Thus, the Chinese “ideology” can be recognized as the most effective at the moment precisely because they were the first to think of abandoning the ideology in the classical sense, but began to build a system of rules, values ​​and attitudes that are optimal for the country and the tasks of its development.

And they certainly did not represent an unshakable system of elements, but on the contrary, they were regularly revised. Something was discarded, something was added, something changed. Therefore, the Chinese today are the only ones who do not experience a crisis of ideology. A very useful experience for Russia.

Russia: where are we going?

Speaking about the problem of ideology in our Fatherland, first of all it should be noted that 25 years after the collapse of the USSR it seems already obvious that the idea of ​​the revival of communism is untenable. You cannot step into the same river twice. The experiment in building a communist society was carried out in many different countries: from Cuba and Brazil to China and North Korea, including half of Europe. Everywhere it was necessary to renounce either communism in general or its dogmatic purity. So the desire of some political forces to return to the past like "USSR 2.0" looks ridiculous. Russia can become something new, but not something old.

In fairness, it should be noted that attempts to revive the Russian Empire with the slogan "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality" are no less hopeless. No country in the world has ever returned to such a distant past, and there is absolutely no reason for us to try to do so. Classical autocracy based on a class society is a real nightmare for today, because it means turning off social elevators for most citizens. However, at the end of the autocratic system, there were already some precedents when the road to high achievements was also opened to people from the lower strata of society. True, for this it was necessary to jump above the head. But such situations were usually just a sign of the withering away of the monarchy and the entire system of inheritance of power, not only the supreme, but also lower. If they were appointed to the government of the Russian Empire, if not by inheritance, then the land holdings belonged to the same families for centuries.

Today the world has become too complex, and the monarchy is an insufficiently balanced system of power. Everything is centralized, decision-making at the very top is generally one of the reasons why the Russian Empire lost its flexibility and could not survive in times of crisis.

Modern business simply does not want to work in the conditions of the good old monarchy. Unless the monarchy will be a decorative operetta, as in Europe. But even this is unlikely, because even though we fell out of love with Soviet power in 70 years (although now we yearn for it), our rejection of the monarchy, of class society, sits firmly. Here we are very similar to the Americans. Try to imagine trying to put someone on the throne in the USA! They fled from this across the ocean, and we fought for a long time. The idea of ​​the resumption of tsarism simply will not find supporters and will be swept away by popular indignation.

However, this does not mean that we cannot, like the Chinese, take separate rules, separate models, agreements, procedures that existed in the past and for one reason or another can be quite useful in the present, provided that they are properly remade under conditions of present-day Russia and its goals. On the one hand, although there is a rejection of Western attitudes among the people, which caused obvious harm to Russia in the 90s, at the same time they are quite strong among the urban population. On the other hand, among the Russians there has not yet been a single consensus on the question of how to continue to live, which path to choose. There are many proposals, but all of them, as I have already said, are very odious and not very realistic.

Take the same Orthodoxy. At a certain period, the Russian authorities hoped that religion could become one of the elements of the new ideology. But today it is just as obvious that she did not become one. By the way, it is worth paying attention to how the attitude of the liberal opposition and the intelligentsia towards Orthodoxy has changed since the days of the Soviet Union and to this day. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, being Orthodox in this milieu was considered an absolute prerequisite. After the arrival of Putin, the daily pouring of slops on the Russian Orthodox Church in particular and Orthodoxy in general became just as mandatory. Our liberals even thought of proclaiming Orthodoxy the main reason for the allegedly “slave essence” of the Russian people, forgetting how ardent believers they themselves were a few years ago.

But is the failure of the formation of Orthodoxy as a unifying ideology a reason to reject the religious element altogether from the construction that should replace ideology for us in the future? No way!

Firstly, there is no reason to renounce freedom of conscience and religion, which are guaranteed by the Constitution. These are absolutely useful rights and freedoms, which, on the one hand, make it possible to believe those who want to believe, but on the other hand, do not oblige everyone else to do so.

Secondly, traditional religions are a natural obstacle to creeping Islamization. If a person is looking for faith, then let him come to an Orthodox church, to a mosque where traditional Russian Islam is preached, or to a synagogue, than to listen to radical preachers with ideas of hatred and war. Will it save us from the threat of terrorism and Islamization? Of course not. Correct religious words will not become a universal panacea and a sufficient cure for terrorists. But these elements should undoubtedly be included in the "complex therapy".

By placing completely unnecessary artificial obstacles in these areas, we gain absolutely nothing and lose a lot. Therefore, let it be as it is written in our law: believers have the right to believe. Let them be better Orthodox, Muslims, Jews and Buddhists than rabid Islamists. Of course, this will not save everyone, will not prevent everyone from falling under the influence of radical propaganda, but it will at least protect some, if not many, from its harmful influence. And why is it bad?

In addition, religions traditional for Russia are useful in that they strengthen traditional values ​​for us: family, marriage, respect for the state, and much more, which is attacked by neoliberal propaganda coming from the West. For the same reason, all kinds of American sects associated with the CIA must, of course, be banned.

---

Albert Naryshkin, Crisis of ideologies: where is Russia heading in the 21st century // "Academy of Trinitarianism", M., El No. 77-6567, publ. 22359, 07/30/2016

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Grade 11. "General history XX-beginning 21st century"

1	The world at the beginning of the 20th century The formation of an industrial society. Scientific and technological progress in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. The problem of periodization of scientific and technological revolution. Cycles of economic development of Western countries in the late XIX - mid XX centuries. From monopoly capitalism to a mixed economy.	know: Imperialism, colony, metropolis, modernization, industrial society, second industrial revolution, expansion. To reveal the essence of the modernization process, to characterize the manifestations of modernization in various spheres of European society at the beginning of the 20th century; Compare the experience of modernization in Europe and the USA; compile a synchronous table based on the results of the comparison. Classify countries according to the echelons of capitalist development. Identify and justify your position
2	Changes in the social structure of industrial society.
3-4	World War I 1914-1918 The main stages in the development of the system of international relations in the late XIX - mid-XX centuries. World wars in the history of mankind. Socio-psychological, demographic, economic and political causes of the war.	Know/be able to: Define the concepts: territorial division of the world, imperialist war, positional war, pacifism, collective security system, Versailles-Washington system, League of Nations; Arrange the events of the First World War in chronological order. Productive and: Identify the main contradictions between world powers; To identify the causes of armed conflicts at the beginning of the 20th century; Based on the analysis of educational material, identify the causes of the war, outline the course of hostilities, determine the consequences of the First World War. Participate in the development of mini-projects on the topic
5	The crisis of classical ideologies at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. and search for new models of social development. Social liberalism, social democracy, Christian democracy. Democratization of social and political life and development of the rule of law. Youth, anti-war, environmental, feminist movements. The problem of political terrorism.	Know/be able to: Outline the essence of socio-political trends: Marxism, revisionism, social democracy. Explain why the theory created by K. Marx became widespread in the 20th century; Distinguish between the concepts: "Marxism as a theory" and "Marxism as an ideology"; Explain the reasons for the revolutionary and reformist options for the formation of nation states.
6	Economic and political development of Western countries 1920-1930s. Evolution of ownership, labor relations and entrepreneurship	Know: definition of concepts: Keynesianism, New Deal politics; a crisis Be able to: state the essence of political concepts: liberalism, social democracy, conservatism. Based on the analysis of documents and additional material, compiling a comparative table “Political regimes of industrial countries in the first decades of the 20th century”; Explain the causes of the economic crisis of 1929-1933 and its consequences for Western countries, ways out of the crisis; Reveal the essence of the theory of D. Keynes, express a value judgment about the relevance of this theory for modern Russia
7	The historical nature of totalitarianism and authoritarianism of modern times. Fascism in Italy and Germany. Models of accelerated modernization in the XX century. Marginalization of society in the context of accelerated modernization.	Know/be able to: Define the terms: totalitarianism, fascism. Productive: - explain the reasons for the rise of the fascist movement in Italy and Germany in the 1920s-1930s; Explain the essence of the ideology of fascism; Compare the rise to power of Mussolini and Hitler; Determine how they differ. Explain why the totalitarian ideology has not found distribution in the most developed industrial countries; Conduct a sociological survey on the topic "The spread of fascist ideas in modern world»
8	Political ideology of a totalitarian type. State-legal systems and socio-economic development of society in conditions of totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships.
9	International relations 1920-1930	Know/be able to: Name the causes of World War II. Productive: To reveal the causes of the Second World War, to determine whether they differed from the causes of the First World War; To characterize the diplomatic steps of the West in response to the aggressive actions of Germany, Japan, Italy, to determine why they did not lead to the prevention of war
10-12	World War II 1939-1945 Socio-psychological, demographic, economic and political causes of the war.	Know/be able to: Arrange the events of World War II in chronological order. Characterize the situation on the eve of the war, highlight the goals of the warring parties; Analyze the periodization of the war according to the specified criteria; - characterize the relationship between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the tripartite alliance; Explain different points of view on the contribution of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to the victory over fascism.
13	Public consciousness and spiritual culture in the first half of the XX century. Formation of a non-classical scientific picture of the world . Technocracy and irrationalism in the public consciousness of the 20th century. Worldview foundations of realism and modernism .	Know/be able to: Name the main achievements of world culture in the first half of the 20th century. reveal major changes in the spiritual life, culture of the countries of the world in the first half of the 20th century; Determine what problems reflected the development of philosophical, social thought. Participate in the development and presentation of the project on the topic
14	International relations in the second half of the 20th century .	Know/be able to: Define the terms "cold War, arms race, militarization Economy; Describe the main events of the "cold Wars" in chronological order Explain the conditions under which Determine the causes of international Crises of the Cold War period; Describe the events of the Cold War
15	Western countries in the second half of the 20th century . Features of modern socio-economic processes in the countries of the West and East. Systemic crisis of industrial society at the turn of the 60-70s. Periodization of NTR.	Know/be able to: Explain the relationship between economic Crises and models of social economic and political development.
16	Democratization of social and political life and development of the rule of law .	Know/be able to: Name new features of the political Development of European and American countries. - characterize the socio-political development of countries; in political development. - express value judgments about the prospects for the development of European and American countries
17	Discussion about the post-industrial stage of social development. Information revolution and the formation of the information society. Property, labor and creativity in the information society.	Know/be able to: Define the concepts: economic crisis, scientific and technological revolution, "welfare society", information revolution. To identify the causes, essence, consequences of scientific and technological revolution. Describe the main directions of scientific and technological revolution. Explain the features of the process of globalization.
18	Eastern European countries in the second half of the 20th century.	Know/be able to: Name the new features of the political and Socio-economic development of countries Eastern Europe in the 40-90s. Characterize the socio-political Development of countries; Identify and analyze new traits in political development. Express value judgments about the prospects for the development of European and American countries
19	Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the second half of the 20th century. "Newly industrialized countries" of Latin America and Southeast Asia: authoritarianism and democracy in political life, economic reforms. National liberation movements and regional features of the modernization process in Asia and Africa.
20-21	Globalization of social development at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. Internationalization of the economy and the formation of a single information space . Integration and disintegration processes in the modern world.	Know/be able to: Define the concepts: globalization, global problems of our time. Describe the main problems of our time. Predict ways to solve global problems
22-23	Features of the spiritual life of modern society. Changes in the scientific picture of the world . Worldview foundations of postmodernism . The role of elite and mass culture in the information society. Religion and church in modern public life. ecumenism. Reasons for the revival of religious fundamentalism and nationalist extremism at the beginning of the 21st century.	Know / be able to: define the concepts: ecumenism, religious fundamentalism and nationalist extremism; Determine the relationship and features of the history of Russia and the world; Present the results of the study of historical material in abstracts, abstracts, reviews; Participate in discussions on historical issues, Formulate your own position on the issues under discussion.

First of all, the classification of ideologies can be carried out according to the stages of its development. Interpreting political ideology as an ideal construction that reflects the interests of individual communities of social groups, the so-called classical ideologies: liberalism, conservatism and socialism. All these ideologies have long roots in European social thought, are based on the values ​​of Western civilization and have a long history of their existence, thanks to which these doctrines developed, evolved, acquiring new maxims and borrowing some ideas from each other. But the emergence of political ideologies in the political space is associated with the emergence of political parties and organizations.

liberal ideology originated in modern times and was fed by the ideas of the French Enlightenment, the Great French and American revolutions about the freedom of the individual, the rule of law, civil society that limits the state, and the creation of conditions for the realization of human rights. The ideal of the socio-political structure of liberalism is a parliamentary republic or a parliamentary monarchy. The main value of liberalism is the individual, his free development and self-realization through his own efforts and talents, but thanks to equal opportunities. In the economy, priority is given to private property. These priorities were reflected in the works of such classics of liberal thought as D. Locke, A. Smith, A. Tocqueville, C. Montesquieu, J. S. Mill. In the XX century. liberalism especially developed in the works of X. Belloc, F. Teitland, B. Russell, who formed a separate branch called "pluralism". In the same period, the economic foundations of liberalism, a kind of liberal manifesto of modernity, was formulated by M. Friedman in his concept of a monetary economy, which justifies the reduction of state intervention in the economy.

Pluralism and neoliberalism in this case are focused on expanding the practices and forms of political and civic participation in public life, on the need to exist within the framework of a developing democratic structure of various organizations, associations, interest groups within civil society, which complements and enriches the classical political representation in the conditions of parliamentary democracies.

It should be noted that modern ideological thought does not exclude such forms as, for example, social liberalism, based on the adoption of a number of ideas. welfare state, which implies a certain degree of nationalization of the economy and the provision of social guarantees.

modern socialism(especially in its political manifestations) includes many different currents. Obviously, the socio-political model of the European social democracy differs significantly from the model of the Latin American socialists or from the Chinese communists. At the same time, it was the socialist ideology that significantly changed the socio-political map of the 20th century. The socio-political ideal of socialists is based on the assumption that the basic unit of society is a social group. This is the ideology of collectivism in the first place. Following this logic, the power in the state should be wholly or to a greater extent belong to the working people, i.e. direct producers of material and (or) spiritual goods, directly or through the representation procedure. A state based on the principles of election and representativeness (parliamentary) through various mechanisms, the development of civil society, local and territorial self-government and management of labor collectives, ensures a high degree of participation of the population in political and social life. The split in the left ideology occurred at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, when the left radical communist wing and social democracy were formed.

Note that at the beginning of the XX century. it was the left that came up with projects of social reconstruction that actually changed the world. Socialism and socialist values ​​fit into the political practice of Western civilization in such a way that it is possible not only to name the 20th century after R. Dahrendorf. a century of social democracy, but also a century of realized social utopia.

The expansion of the socialist area after the Second World War, on the one hand, and the formation of welfare states, on the other, demonstrated different variants and ways of implementing leftist ideas in society.

The proclaimed values ​​of both the communist and socialist wings of the left were social justice, freedom and equality of chance, solidarity and social responsibility. Having different content in the programs and political practices of the West and the East, these maxims were equally included in the political discourse of the left. However, since the time of Bernstein, the social democratic and communist trends have diverged in terms of instrumental values, where the main line of disputes has been over the question of how to achieve an ideal or optimal social order. Revolutionary measures for some and evolution for others - this is what separated socialists and communists on different sides of the barricades. Other demarcation lines of disputes were questions about the limits of the nationalization of state property, pluralism in political life and a multi-party system, the limits of the use of violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the relationship between individual freedom and the good of all, personal and social principles.

Socialists and social democrats throughout the 20th century. they did not share communist ideas about the dictatorship and hegemony of the proletariat, about the eradication of private property, about the permissibility of terror and violence in a dictatorship, just as they did not accept many components of real socialism. As for the attitude towards state property, modern socialists and social democrats have abandoned the once-seeming classical idea that state, public and (or) other types of non-private property should be the predominant form of property.

During the 20th century, on the one hand, communist regimes were formed, and communism ceased to be just an idea and turned into a practice of real economic and political transformation of society. However, the widespread use of authoritarian and totalitarian practices has largely compromised the leftist idea. The disregard for the right to property was accompanied by disregard for other human rights against the background of the growth of the state-bureaucratic machine and very mediocre economic results.

On the other hand, after the Second World War, the Social Democrats incorporated into political structures, actively participated in parliamentary activities, began to form governments in most European countries and in many ways contributed to the change and transformation of the social system. Western Europe, thanks to which it became possible to form various models of the social state, the welfare state.

Socialism in the modern sense appears as a method of historical action based on the priority of collectivist solidarity, social control, and public initiative.

It was these principles and methods of self-presentation that were demonstrated by the socialist and social democratic parties of Europe, which were especially strengthened in the course of the formation and development of parliamentary and democratic regimes.

Conservatism in modern politics is represented primarily by social teachings and political doctrines that insist on the connection of the past and the present, on the reproduction of the best experience of

past, preventing oblivion of basic civilizational and cultural skills and traditions. The ideal of the socio-political structure of conservatism is stability, order, continuity, based on authority and freedom. Conservatism does not exclude change, but builds its political program on loyalty and civic responsibility. As S. Huntington noted, "conservatism is a system of ideas used to protect any established order, regardless of place and time ... The essence of conservatism is its passionate assertion of the value of existing institutions." Conservatives usually lean towards a limited monarchy or such forms of presidential and parliamentary republics, which provide for a supreme office that concentrates a large amount of power (president, prime minister). Worldview conservatives are often associated with religion, both in the West and in the East, and tend to use religious dogmas as explanatory models in political and social life. The source of civil society, according to conservatives, is the state, which both gives the citizen freedom and limits it in the interests of the common good.

Conservatism in the politics of the 20th century. most clearly expressed in the reforms of M. Thatcher and R. Reagan. Note that conservative economists already in the 1970s. emphasized the negative role of state interference in economic development, calling for limiting the role of the state in this area. Their increasing presence in state bureaucracies, the strengthening of the role of public choice theories and the theory of "main actors and agents" made possible the spread of "Thatcherism" and "Reaganomics", which caused a wave of social protests in both the UK and the USA.

In the new conditions at the end of the XX - beginning of the XXI century. postmodern society gives rise to new contradictions, new risks, becomes a society of the so-called fluid modernity, where individual choice becomes a priority, and the role of group mechanisms of self-identification is reduced, which causes a crisis of traditional classical ideologies and those political parties that are associated with them.

Global risks: the social inequality of capitalism, the destruction of the ecosystem, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of democratic freedoms, the aggravation of gender contradictions, racial and ethnic conflicts, civilizational clashes - naturally give rise to the so-called new ideologies : "ideologies of globalism and anti-globalism ", ideology of the "greens".

At the same time, according to the same Giddens, the ideological approach both in politics and in science has its place in the postmodern situation. Sociopolitical theories continue to be in the force field of two ideological poles - capitalism and socialism. And no matter what they write about socialism (both the fact that it existed only as a utopian program, and the fact that real socialism had nothing in common with Marx's theory), it still remains the theoretical basis for those who do not accept capitalist principles. That is, socialism as an ideological construction exists, is reproduced, reconstructed and continues to function. Similarly, liberal constructs continue to develop and evolve. In a number of his writings, Giddens pays attention to overcoming the dichotomy between "left and right" ideological positions.

At the end of the XX century. many researchers have stated a serious crisis in which political parties oriented towards classical ideological doctrines found themselves. This crisis was expressed in a decrease in the level of trust in political parties, in a reduction in their numbers, in the devaluation of ideological values ​​and postulates. Political competition manifested itself not so much as a struggle of ideas and programs, but as a rivalry of images. Under these conditions, the "majority parties" began to shift to the center of the political spectrum, trying to become the so-called catch all party, and supporters of extreme, radical ideas gradually became marginalized. The system parties tried to adapt their strategy and main characteristics to the model of mass parties. These trends contributed to the emergence of parties, which O. Kirkheimer called parties "catch-all" ("grab everyone"). "A new type of party is developing, which is neither a cadre party nor a mass party, but an "omnivorous party" (O. Kirkheimer), a "party of voters" (J. Charlot) or a "party of attraction" (P.-J. Schwarzenberg)" . Such parties can be right-wing, centrist or left-wing. They are inter-class and even inter-ideological movements, entirely aimed at the electorate.

This crisis of the representativeness of parties and politics, which can be described as a crisis of "party form", was accompanied by the erosion of ideological guidelines; visible differences in the policies of socialists and liberals became less and less obvious.

As a result, the traditional division between right and left has ceased to be so clear-cut. Both right and left parties began to borrow ideas from each other, trying to focus on the needs of the mass electorate.

The liberals actively included a social component in their programs, while the socialist and social democratic parties of Europe actually refused to use even the concept of "socialism". Indicative in this regard are the results of the elections, when the main competitors over and over again come to the finish line with almost the same result. We observed such a situation in the USA in 2000 and 2004, in Germany in 2005, in Italy, Sweden and Mexico in 2006, in France in 2007.

As A. Touraine rightly noted, European governments began to move "from socialism to capitalism", and the market again "replaced the state as the main regulating force of our society." Public sector reforms swept through almost all European countries to a greater or lesser extent and were mainly associated with a policy of transition to new management models, which primarily implied an increase in the efficiency of providing services to the population while reducing costs, removing the burden from public budgets at all levels. The most important role in this model is played, on the one hand, by changing the very structure of state ownership by changing the composition of its elements and autonomization, and, on the other hand, by shifting the emphasis from the direct provision of services to citizens by the public sector to stimulating the development of all sectors of the economy (Owen). And although managerialization in public administration is more often associated with "regonomics" and "Thatcherism", European countries where social democrats and socialists were in power also adopted a lot from this, in fact, conservative and neoliberal model.

The result of the search for new forms and new ideological guidelines was the strategy of the so-called third way, set forth in the Manifesto of T. Blair and G. Schroeder, signed in 1999. Note that one of the ideologists of this document was one of the most famous sociologists of our time, E. Giddens, was a personal adviser to Prime Minister T. Blair, participated in the development of the program of the Labor Party of Great Britain. As Giddens himself noted, the concept of "third way" appeared because there was a "first way" (the path of the left) - in the West, the classical welfare state; there were also communist societies where the state played a dominant role.

On the other hand, liberal projects in the spirit of trade and market philosophy (Thatcherism, Regonomics) have also demonstrated their effectiveness. At the same time, there was an understanding that it was impossible to manage society as a market, some third alternative was needed.

In this new social context, the "third way" arose as an answer to the question: "How to build a just society in certain conditions?" Therefore, the problem of the third way, according to Giddens, is relevant for both Russia and China. It is about how to link politics, economics and society in a period of democratic change (Giddens).

Many left-wing sociologists, analyzing European reality, bitterly stated that the ideological crisis of socialism caused the activation of right-wing and conservative sentiments, that "the market, replacing the state, promotes the development of individualism and consumption in its most unpleasant manifestations" (Touraine).

The left-wing parties, which are traditionally mass parties, experienced the loss of their electorate and the crisis associated with electoral defeats more difficult than other parties. And although socialists and social democrats actively moved away from the class approach in the second half of the 20th century, trying to expand their electorate at the expense of other social groups, socialist rhetoric often remained unclaimed. This happened partly because in most Western European countries a relatively high level of social guarantees and rights was achieved, partly because the problems of regulating foreign labor and the country's place in the new international political and economic system caused by globalization processes were put on the agenda. And these questions were articulated mainly by conservative and right-wing parties.

Thus, four types of classifications of political ideologies can be distinguished.

By purpose and core values within the framework of the axiological approach, liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, and communism are distinguished. In turn, each of these ideologies implies different varieties and currents. So, in modern society, we can distinguish pluralism and neoliberalism within the framework of traditional liberalism, social democratic and communist versions within the framework of socialist ideology.

By place on the political continuum right, left, centrist. Within the framework of this typology, right-wing political parties traditionally include conservative, nationalist, liberal parties, while left-wing parties include social-democratic, socialist, communist, and radical left-wing parties. Note that the analysis of modern ideologies within the framework of the proposed right-wing school is not always justified, since in recent decades ideologies have appeared that do not fit into these criteria, for example, "green" ideologies, environmentalist ideologies, feminist ideologies, globalist and anti-globalist ideologies.

According to the source subject, articulating ideological maxims: party, state, religious, corporate, gender, etc.

Depending on the social base (within the framework of class or stratification approaches).

A peculiar form of manifestation of worldview changes are the concepts that proclaimed end of ideology. This formulation of the question is due to the fact that the role of ideology in the world of politics varies depending on historical conditions, the situation in the country, the balance of power. It was on this basis that in the 1960s 20th century D. Bell, R. Aron and X. Arendt concluded about the "end of ideology" and the beginning of the era of de-ideologization.

D. Bell associated this process with the de-ideologization of mass culture, which becomes the main tool for shaping the way of life, norms, values, culture, and H. Arendt emphasized that in a pluralistic society, unlike a totalitarian one, ideology cannot become dominant and dominating. The quintessence of these ideas was reflected in the work of F. Fukuyama "The End of History?", where the idea of ​​the death of the ideology of communism and the transition to a society of free competition was postulated. different types culture.

The collapse of the USSR, the destruction of the world socialist system, the inclusion of post-socialist countries in the third wave of democratization, on the one hand, as well as the successes and evolution of the welfare state, which synthesized the principles of liberalism and social democracy, on the other, gave reason to talk about a decrease in the role of ideologies in the political process and about the departure of ideology from public discourse.

But literally a decade later, the strengthening of the role of factors that needed ideological assessments (racial unrest, a wave of cultural nonconformity in Europe, unemployment, inflation, the crisis of the welfare society, etc.) forced scientists to talk about the "era of re-ideologization." At the same time, understanding the results and consequences of neoliberal reforms against the backdrop of the outbreak of the financial crisis is increasingly taking the form of a socialism-liberalism dichotomy.

As for Russia, after the collapse of the socialist system, there was a massive rejection of ideological constructs, which was largely the result of the ideological dictate of previous years. The very word "ideology" acquired a negative context, and the reforms of the 1990s. marked an era "end of ideology" implying a complete de-ideologization of public life.

However, in reality, this did not mean the absence of an ideology of reforms, which were clearly liberal in nature and became a concentrated expression of the ideology of right-wing liberalism.

In the context of a multi-party system and ideological confusion, it was difficult to consolidate the electorate and agree on political positions. As a result, the part of the political elite that carried out the privatization in its own interests and quickly returned to using the administrative resource won. United Russia, as the successor to previous parties in power, used the rhetoric of a "supra-ideological party" in this regard for a long time, while trying to become the so-called "catch all party "a conditional political center, which was declared by its leaders. Turning to the Russian parliamentary elections of 1999, 2003, 2007, let's say that it was no coincidence that they demanded political centrism, implicated in state ideology. A huge number of citizens, without fully dividing neither right nor left ideological constructs and not formally belonging to the so-called "middle class", nevertheless, they considered themselves to be in it.The idea of ​​the center as an expression of stability and stability was then very popular in an unstable society.

At the same time, parties of the right and left spectrum were formed and institutionalized in Russia, their succession largely forced United Russia to look for new ideological guidelines, which were traditional conservative values.

Let us note that the process of formation of the classical "left-right spectrum" in Russia, as well as in most CIS countries, has not yet been completed. It is possible that under the conditions of the dominance of one party, the party-ideological landscape will acquire other "non-classical" forms.

Komsomol crisis

The crisis, of course, captured the Komsomol (Communist Youth Union). The apparatus of the Komsomol has always been an obedient instrument of the party apparatus, and the Komsomol organizations were controlled and directed by the party organizations. Now, for the first time in Soviet history, the apparatus of the Komsomol came into conflict with the party apparatus, and the rank-and-file Komsomol en masse actually got out of control of the party. Staying in the Komsomol has lost its former meaning. Many Komsomol members (both former and current) joined the ranks of the rebellious population. The crisis of the Komsomol is a heavy blow to the system of power, since the bulk of the party members were replenished through the Komsomol, and work in the apparatus of the Komsomol was preparation and training for party work. Thus, a threat arose to the very mechanism of reproduction of the personnel of the system of power.

Already in the Khrushchev years, there was a crisis of Soviet ideology. But this was still a crisis of only that form of ideology which had taken shape in the Stalin years and was associated with the writings of Stalin himself. During the Brezhnev years, a powerful ideological mechanism, created and working under the leadership of Suslov, made efforts to overcome this crisis. And he has achieved a lot. Criticism of the Stalinist vulgarization of philosophy began. Achievements of science poured into ideology. Western philosophy and culture became accessible. All this helped to improve the reputation of the ideology. But at the same time, this led to a decrease in the authority of Marxism-Leninism, pushing it into the background within the framework of the ideology itself. To some extent, having overcome the shortcomings of the Stalinist form of ideology, the Suslov ideological apparatus simultaneously contributed to the preparation of a more extensive ideological crisis - the crisis of Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of communism in general. In the Brezhnev years, a sharp discrepancy between the ideological picture of reality and reality itself, between the ideals of communism and the objective trends in the evolution of real communism, between the intellectual level of the educated part of society and ideology began to be openly recognized. Ideology actually ceased to be a guide to action for the authorities. Although they covered themselves with phrases from ideology, in practice they acted quite differently. Ideological cynicism killed the remnants of ideological faith. Marxist ideology was increasingly becoming the subject of ridicule. Millions of people have studied it, but only formally. The more powerful the ideological apparatus became, the less effective its activity became.

In the Stalin years, the dominant belief was that the communist social order would bring liberation for the working people from the evils of capitalism and that the working people would succumb to the spell of a communist earthly paradise. During the Brezhnev years, an active part of the Soviet population, including representatives of the authorities who began to make a career in the Khrushchev years, made for themselves a discovery of great historical significance. She felt from her own experience that the communist social system is not the earthly paradise that it is portrayed in Soviet ideology and propaganda. The belief in the truth of ideology was replaced by a purely pragmatic attitude towards it as a necessary means of processing and organizing social consciousness. The ideologically mediated attitude to reality has been replaced by an almost direct one, devoid of subjective illusions and only masked by ideology.

Gorbachev's policy of glasnost deepened and widened the ideological crisis. Began unrestrained and uncontrolled verbiage, masochistic self-exposure, spitting on all the shrines of Soviet history, vilification of Soviet reality. All the truths of Marxism-Leninism were subject to doubt and ridicule. Any defense of even its indisputable truths was regarded as a sign of reactionary and backwardness. It became indecent to pronounce the word "communism" itself. Compulsory study of Marxism-Leninism was abolished in many educational institutions, the time for it was reduced, the corresponding seminars, schools, and courses were completely reduced or eliminated. In short, Marxism-Leninism was treated almost like a hostile ideological doctrine. At the same time, an equally unrestrained borrowing of ideas from Western ideology began. The desire to look Western-style and earn praise in the West became the determining factor in the speeches and in the reformist fuss of Gorbachev himself, as well as all other reformers and ideologists of perestroika.

The most important feature of the ideological crisis is that disbelief in Marxist ideals and the rejection of Marxism-Leninism as a guide to action has captured the very top of the ruling stratum. The discrediting of ideology began to be stimulated from above, something that Soviet history has never known before. Moreover, Marxism-Leninism was not comprehended and overcome on scientific basis, but simply pushed aside as something no longer suitable either for propaganda or for making important decisions. And this despite the fact that the provisions of Marxism-Leninism could, more than ever, serve as a guiding star in the current confused situation in the world. The Communists betrayed Marxism-Leninism just when it was worth insisting on it most stubbornly.

A characteristic example of the barbaric treatment of their own, Marxist-Leninist ideology is that Gorbachev's vanity began to consider their reformist vanity as a revolution, moreover, as a revolution carried out from above, on the initiative of the top leadership, one might say, on the initiative of Gorbachev personally and under his control. . I have already said that the initiative from above only gave impetus to the crisis and that the authorities lost control over the course of events. Now we are talking about the ideological understanding of what is happening. The use of the expression "revolution" when applied to situations of this kind, as in the Soviet Union, is pardonable for Western cultural figures, journalists and politicians who do not have strict restrictions on word usage. But when the Soviet party apparatchiks, who have become proficient in Marxism, and the Marxist-Leninist theoreticians who justify their activity, begin to deal so easily with the most important categories of the state Soviet ideology, the doubt involuntarily creeps in: are these people in their minds?! How long ago, when they passed exams in Marxism-Leninism, did they themselves insist that the revolutionary path is fundamentally different from the reformist one, that the social revolution is a way of transition from an obsolete socio-economic formation to a more progressive one. Of course, as they say, own hand is the lord. The highest Soviet power is also the highest power in ideology. She can sometimes afford to flirt with the fundamental concepts of a subservient ideology. Moreover, it is so flattering to go down in history as a revolutionary, moreover, as a revolutionary of a special kind, who made a coup, one might say, alone. What a human being! Marx, Lenin and Stalin taken together were incapable of such a thing. And there is nothing to say about Khrushchev: a trifle!

But the fact is that ideology also has its own laws, which are not subject even to such “revolutionaries” (“dissidents on the throne”) as Gorbachev. And the violation of these laws cannot go unpunished, even for those who are in charge of ideology. The frivolous treatment of the fundamental concepts and provisions of ideology at the very top of power served as a contagious example, and masses of people, somehow involved in ideology, rushed into anti-Marxism. And the deserters of Marxism ran ahead of everyone, who, in theory, should have defended it to the last word. The “new thinking” of the Gorbachevites has grown into thoughtless and irresponsible chatter, fraught with dire consequences. The impression is that a huge historical bomb fell into the hands of rascals and half-wits, and they began to beat on it with anything and poking around with the intention of admiring the supposed fireworks.

Rejecting the Marxist-Leninist ideology as a guide to action, Gorbachev's leadership, however, did not make science such a guide. This does not mean that it has not attracted professional scientists to its aid. On the contrary, it attracted them in huge numbers, freeing them from all ideological fetters and allowing them to write and say whatever came to their mind. But the trouble is that these scientific assistants and advisers to Gorbachev simply did not have ready-made science at hand that could serve as a reliable mentor of the actions of the authorities. Countless Soviet scientists over the many decades of the existence of real communism proved unable to create a science about this type of society that meets the criteria of modern science. The most important obstacle to the creation of such a science was the state ideology. Any attempts to follow this path were considered as a hostile slander against Soviet society and were persecuted. And now, when this obstacle has disappeared, Soviet scientists began to hastily express their artisanal and hasty judgments, including in them ideas borrowed from the West, which gave rise to monstrous intellectual chaos in Gorbachev's environment. In the shortest possible time, a huge amount of all sorts of nonsense was composed. Countless charlatans and irresponsible talkers, including titled Soviet academicians, former Soviet dissidents who fled to the West for fame and comfort, and Western Sovietologists, have so polluted and muddied the intellectual atmosphere in society that only a complete disregard for the nonsense they produce and trust in simple common sense still could guide the leadership on the right path. But, alas, all sound judgments began to be regarded as manifestations of conservatism, Brezhnevism and even Stalinism. Only unlimited nonsense, dressed in a scientific form, had any chance of being noticed.